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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) Case No. 
vs. ) 13007 
) 
JESSE BAUTISTA & JOHN FRANCIS) 
BAUTISTA, ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants. ) 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING AND BRIEF 
Appeal from the judgment of the Se-
cond Judicial District Court for Weber 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable John 
F. Wahlquist, presiding. 
VERNON D. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM D. MARSH, Esq. 
1018 First Security Bank 
Building 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendants-
Appellants 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) Case No. 
vs. ) 13007 
) 
JESSE BAUTISTA & JOHN FRANCIS) PETITION FOR 
BAUTISTA, ) RE-HF.ARING 
) 
Defendants-Appellants. ) 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND ASSOCI-
ATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF l1IE 
STATE OF UTAH: 
1. The Court's decision in the above 
entitled matter was filed on September 27, 
1973. 
2. Appellants seek a re-hearing on 
Point I alleging: 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISPLAYING 
A CO-DEFENDANT NOT ON 'l'RIAL, TO THE 
JURY WHILE CHAINED, HANDCUFFED, UN-
SHAVEN, UNGROOMED AND DRESSED IN 
COMMON JAIL ATTIRE AFTER DEFENDANTS 
RAISED THE DEFENSE OF CONSENT TO 
RAPE AND ROBBERY CHARGES. 
3. It is respectfully submitted that 
this Honor ab le Court erred in making a 
factual decision: 
. . • Tile presence of the individual 
could not have prejudiced the Defen-
dants. The record does not disclose 
that the third defendant was identi-
fied to the jury or was anything 
said or done which would tend to con-
nect him with the two defendants on 
trial. 
4. A closer review of the record dis-
closes that the alleged co-defendant was 
carefully and completely identified to the 
jury under testimony directly connecting 
him with the Defendants at trial. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is prayed 
that this petition be granted. 
Respectfully submitted. 
WILLIAM D. MARSH 
Attorney for Defendants-
Appe llants 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Plaintiff & Respondent, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
JESSE BAUTISTA & JOHN FRANCIS) 
BAUTISTA, ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants. ) 
Case No. 
13007 
BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF TIIE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for re-hearing on 
an issue of fact decided against Appellants 
on Point I of Appellants' brief. The ap-
peals arose from convictions of rape and 
robbery and sentences to the Utah State 
Prison on each count for each Defendant. 
The case was tried to a jury with the Hon-
arable John F. Wahlquist presiding. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellants were charged by informa-
tion with the crimes of robbery and rape. 
Upon pleas of not guilty, a jury trial was 
held and Appellants were each found guilty 
of each charge and committed to the Utah 
State Prison to serve terms for ten years 
to life (R 69, 70). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the convic-
tions and judgment of the Lower Court and 
ask that the cases be remanded for new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this petition 
for re-hearing are as follows: Defendants-
Appellants were charged with rape and robbery. 
Both testified raising the defense of consent 
-2-
and a considerable amount of evidence of 
consent was before the Court (R 243, 244) 
a third defendant had also been charged, 
was awaiting a separate trial and was lan-
quishing in jailo After the State had 
rested, Defendants began to introduce tes-
timony in their defense. The Trial Judge 
abruptly interrupted the testimony and 
sUII1I1oned counsel to the bench to advise 
them that the Third Defendant had been 
brought into the Court (R 254)0 
The Judge later acknowledged that the 
Third Defendant had been introduced to the 
courtroom while trial was in progress "in 
order to avoid delay" and to "have him 
somewhere available if he is wanted." 
When asked by defense counsel if the 
-3-
prosecutor had requested that he be brought 
in, the judge replied "I did this myself 
0 
11 
(R 283). The trial judge stated: 
"The record may show that Batchelor 
was brought down, and that he is in 
jail clothes and the defense makes 
the motion to redress him before they 
put him in the Courtroom. The Court 
denies this. lhe jury understands 
that he is in jail, and he has got 
jail clothes on, and he has been brought 
in in irons and is handcuffed." (R 254) 
The Court casually observed that the 
man "looked like an ordinary prisoner" 
(R 285) and allowed him to be identified 
as the driver of the vehicle in which De• 
fendants and prosecutrix had previously 
testified they were riding. (R 290-291) 
Later, in a chambers conference Mr. 
Bachelor was interrogated (R 287-88) and 
the following testimony elicited. 
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"Q. Were you at the time in your 
regular jail attire, jail clothes? 
A. Yes, sir o 
Q. Were you given an opportunity to 
put on your street clothes? 
A. No, sir· ' 
I was not. 
Q. Were you advised as to where you 
were to be taken? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Were you brought from the jail 
into the Courtroom directly? 
Ao Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you have an opportlmity to 
consult with your legal counsel 
before· you were brought here? 
A. No, sir, I did not. 
Q. Did you have an opportunity to 
shave prior to coming here? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When was the last time you shaved? 
A. Yesterday. 
-5-
Qo Were you given an opportunity to 
comb your hair? 
A. No, siro 
Q. When was the last time you coni>ed 
your hair? 
Ao Yesterday." 
Objections to the co-defendant being 
in the Courtroom in this condition for iden-
tification purposes were timely and properly 
registered by the defense, (R 254 and 290) 
and were renewed in the motion for mistrial 
(R 282). 
On appeal the Defendants set forth the 
above facts and argued that the trial court's 
action in introducing the co-defendant in the 
condition stated deprived them of a fair 
trial. In an opinion filed September 27, 
1973, this Court stated: 
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"It does not appear that either the 
prosecution or the defense intended 
to call this man as a witness or that 
his presence was necessary for any 
other purpose. The Trial Court appar-
ently anticipated that the presence 
of the third defendant might become 
necessary. While it appears that this 
action did not serve a useful purpose, 
nevertheless the presence of that in-
dividual could not have prejudiced the 
defendants. The record does not dis-
close that the third defendant was 
identified to the jury or was anything 
said or done which would tend to connect 
him with the two defendants on trial. 
The failure of the Court to grant the 
Defendants' motion for mistrial was 
no erroro" (Emphasis added.) 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FACTUAL 
DECISION THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE IN-
DIVIDUAL COULD NOT HAVE PREJUDICED THE 
DEFENDANTS IN THAT THE RECORD DOES DIS-
CLOSE THAT THE CO-DEFENDANT WAS IDEN-
TIFIED TO 'nlE JURY FOR THE VERY PURPOSE 
OF CONNECTING HIM WITH TilE DEFENDANTS. 
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By the time that Batchelor was intro-
duced to the Courtroom, the prosecutrix had 
made the jury aware of the existence of a 
third alleged assailant - a caucasian who 
drove the automobile during the alleged as-
sault (R 126, 12 7, 128, 132, 133, 134, 136 
and 137). 
Furthermore, Defendant Jesse Bautista 
had testified that he had been riding with Mr. 
Batchelor on the night in question in Hr. 
Batchelor's automobile and with Hr. Batchelor 
driving. Hr. Batchelor's name had been re-
ferenced repeatedly throughout the proceeding 
(R 225, 228, 240, 243, 244). Officer Darryl 
Jones had stated that on February 11, 1972, 
he .. pulled over" a "white '60 Dodge" and that 
-8-
"Driving the vehicle, whom I removed 
and aaked for identification, was a 
Fred Gary Batchelor, and then on the 
passenger's side of the vehicle was 
John Bautistao" (Emphasis added.) 
1be officer further stated that in 
the rear seat of the vehicle there was a 
man who appeared to be "chicano" and a 
"young lady" (R 201) who "appeared to be 
embraced most of the time" (R 204). The 
incident wherein the automobile had been 
pulled over and the driver interrogated 
had been recounted by virtually all wit• 
nesses in the trial including the Defendants 
(R 236, 273, 274), the prosecutrix, (R 172· 
175) and officers Jones (R 201-203), Passey 
(R208-209) and Shupe (R 216-220). 
Mr. Batchelor was first introduced to 
the jury during the testimony of Gilbert 
-9-
Gallegos, the defense witness who was asked 
''Mr. Gallegos, can you see this gentleman 
that was just brought into the Court room?" 
1be prosecutor then asked the defense wit-
ness to identify the man and when he was un-
able to do so, the prosecutor stated "Okay. 
that's all I have of Mr. Batchelor. He can 
be removed." The bailiff proceeded to re-
move him stating "Okay, Batchelor." 
When the propriety of this identifica-
tion was challenged in a motion for mistrial 
the prosecutor stated "the sole purpose of 
calling Mro Batchelor was strictly for iden-
tification purposes". (Emphasis added) 
The Trial Judge replied ''Right now there is 
no record that that was Batchelor. 'lbere 
is an implication that was Batchelor. Right 
now there is no evidence that was Batchelor.u 
-10-
Counsel for Defendants therein reminded 
the Judge that the prosecutor had referred 
to Mr. Batchelor by name when he failed 
in his attempt to have Batchelor identi-
fied by Defendants' witness. The Judge 
then advised the prosecution ul think 
{!iefendantl would be entitled to a mistrial 
unless you had someone who saw that man 
in the Courtroom." 
'!be following conversation then oc-
curred: 
Mr. Neeley: I intend to call Miss Jill 
Bateman and she will be able to iden-
tify at this point in time the man. 
It is my intention to call Jill 
Bateman and I believe she can identify 
this fellow as the one who was driving 
the car. 
Mr. Marsh: Haw would that correct anything? 
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'!be Court: If she knows who the fellow 
was, in fact, and to know who the 
fellow was in fact is a matter of 
record. You can do this. 
Mr. Marsh: I would object to having him 
brought in the trial at all. He is 
not on trial today and it would only 
serve to aggravate the situation by 
reintroducing him. 
Mr. Neeley: I don't intend to reintroduce 
him. 
Mr. Marsh: You have certainly made an ef-
fort of it the first time. 
Mro Neeley: I think she can properly iden-
tify him without being brought back 
down again. 
Mr. Marsh: I think the identification is 
improper. 
Mro Neeley: If she cannot, then I would 
request that he be brought down for 
proper identification. 
Mr. Marsh: Mr objection is not whether 
there was proper identification of 
him; my objection was that it was 
-12-
improper to bring him down for iden-
tification in the condition in which 
he was brought down. 
The Court: I tmderstand your objection. 
He didn't look that bad to me. I 
will overrule the objection. He 
looked like an ordinary prisoner." 
(R 284-285) 
The prosecutor then recalled Officer 
Passe in lieu of the prosecutrix. After 
referring his earlier testimony concerning 
the stopping of the Batchelor vehicle the 
following testimony was given: 
''Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Were you present in Court this 
morning when a man in denims was 
brought into the Courtroom for 
identification purposes of one 
Gilbert Gallegos? 
Yeso 
I ask you if you have ever seen 
this gentleman before, the one 
that was in blue denims? 
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Ao Yes, sir. 
Q. That was being identified? 
A. Yes o 
Q. Where did you see him? (At this 
point, defense counsel reasserted 
Defendants' objection to the testi-
mony and identification of Fred 
Gary Batchelor based upon the appear-
ance of Mr. Batchelor but said ob-
jection was overruled.) 
The Court: The objection is overruled, you 
may proceed. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Officer Passe, where have you seen 
this individual in denims before? 
I saw him the evening or the morn-
ing of the 11th of February, 1972. 
Had you seen him prior to that time? 
No, sir. 
What about the occasion at the 7-11 
Store? Did you have an occasion to 
see that gentleman there before? 
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A. Yes, sir, noo Pardon me, before 
that time. A date before. 
Q. 1he time I am concerned with is 
at the 7-11 Store on February 11, 
at approximately 2:30 a.m., in 
the morning. 
A. Yes, sir; I saw him at that time. 
Q. You are sure you know what period 
of time I am talking about? 
A. Yes, sir. The morning of the 11th. 
Q. Yes. Who were you with? 
A. I was alone in my vehicle stationed 
next to the other police vehicle 
with Mr. Batchelor, I believe is 
his name, in the back of the other 
police vehicle. 
Q. Who was the other officer in the 
vehicle in which this fellow in-
denims was in, who was driving 
that vehicle? 
A. Officer Jones. 
Q. You observed this fellow at this tine? 
-15-
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And, you were making a check of 
his drivers license? 
A. 1bat is correct. 
Q. And, also a want on that particu-
lar individual? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is there any question in your mind, 
whatsoever, that the individual 
that was brought into this Court-
room in blue denims this morning 
for identification is one and the 
same person that was in that car 
with Officer Jones that night? 
A. There is no question at all in my 
mind, air. (R 289-291) 
From the above there can be no doubt 
that Batchelor was identified to the jury 
as the driver of the vehicle in which the 
prosecutrix and Defendants were riding on 
the night in question. 
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As noted in Appellants' prior brief, 
these appeals present an issue of first 
impression before this Courto Defendants 
contest the propriety of the Trial Judge's 
unilateral disruption of a trial to bring 
a co-defendant - not then on trial - from 
the jail to be paraded in front of the jury 
"for identification purposes" while dressed 
in common jail attire, while unshaven, un-
groomed, and tminf or med as to where and for 
"*iat purpose he was to be taken and used. To 
so exhibit a Defendant to a jury would clearly 
be prejudicial error. The Idaho Supreme 
Court has properly observed that a Defendant'• 
right to make a presentable appearance is 
intricately related to the fairness and open-
ness of the trial he receives. State v. 
-17-
Carver, 94 Idaho 677, 496 P2d 676 (1972). 
See also Alexander v. State, Okla
0 
Crim
0 
493 P2d 458 (1972); Garcia v. Beto, 452 F2d 
655 (5th Ciro 1971); Ephriam v. State, 
- ____ Tex. Crim. App. 471 S W ----· .. 
I 2d 798 (1971) 0 
In light of the particular sensitivity · 
of appearance in this case and by a parity 
of reasoning, a compelling argument is made 
that a co-defendant - not on trial - must 
be properly attired before being injected 
into a trial of others charged with personal 
association and with the same criminal acts. 
'!he point could nowhere be more compelling 
than in the trial of a rape case where a con• 
sent is the basis of the defense. Clearly, 
if a man who allegedly was their association 
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makes a slovenly appearance, the defense 
of consent is vitiated and Defendants were 
prejudiced. lbe Trial Court's refusal to 
grant Defendants' timely request that Batchelor . 
be made presentable prior to further contact 
with the jury deprived the Defendants a fair 
trial. The Court's action could accomplish 
nothing more than instilling in the jurors' 
minds that 1'here was a worthless lot". 
See State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 326 
P2d 102. The Trial Judge's assertion that 
Batchelor was introduced to the jury as he 
was "in order to avoid delay" (R 283) is 
not persuasive. No one had asked for him. 
Neither counsel intended to call him and 
both were aware that he was incarcerated in 
the same building and available to them in 
-19-
a matter of minutes if they asked for him. 
Although the jail clothing, \Dlkempt 
appearance, handcuffs and leg irons may 
not influence adversely the thinking of a 
seasoned Trial Judge, it does not follow 
that jurors are similarly calloused. One 
need not dwell on the propriety of the 
Court's motives in taking the action com-
plained of inasmuch as the prejudicial 
effect on the jury can and should be assumed. 
Although Batchelor was not called 
upon to answer questions, the State was 
able to elicit prejudicial testimony from 
him through his silence and appearance. 
It is error for a prosecutor to call a co-
defendant knowing that be will invoke hia 
privilege against self-incrimination and 
-20-
it matters not that the party calling the 
witness was the Judge. See State v. Smith, 
446 P2d 571, 581 (1968). 
The jurors could speculate that since 
Batchelor was not on trial with appellants 
that he had already been convicted or more 
likely entered a plea of guilty. From his 
jail clothes, handcuffs, leg irons and un-
kempt condition, it would be normal to con-
clude that such was the case and that if 
he was guilty the other Defendants were also 
guiltye 
1his Court has repeatedly taken the 
position that a Trial Judge should not on 
its own motion invite the jury to question 
witnesses. State v. Anderson, 108 Utah 130, 
158 P2d 127, (1945) State v. Martinez, 7 
-21-
Utah 2d 387, 326 P2d 102 (1957). In the in-
Ii stant case, jurors were not invited to questioi 
the witness but they were clearly invited to I 
speculate as to why the defense did not 
question him. He could have already been 
convicted or have pled guilty or there might 
have been differences between the Defendants. 
All adds up to one thing, the Trial Court 
put the Defendants in an unwarranted dileuma. 
We would be naive to assume that the jury 
would not interpret the defense's decision 
not to call the witness as evidence of De-
fendants' guilt. 
The issue becomes whether the jury in 
viewing this set of facts as developed could 
have arrived at adverse conclusions influenc-
ing their verdict. If so, the judgment should 
-22-
be reversedo It is flDldamental to a fair 
trial that as many opportunities for specu-
lation as possible be removed from the 
trier of fact. lbis was clearly not done. 
For additional guidance, this Court might 
turn to the U.S. Supreme Court's statement 
that "prejudice is presumed from a material 
error absent an affirmative showing to the 
contrary". Crawford v. United States, 
212 u.s. 183 (1909). Appellants submit that 
the conduct complained of is the kind of 
material error to which the United States 
Supreme Court referred. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing, it is apparent 
that co-defendant Batchelor was· carefully 
identified to the jury and thoroughtly 
-23-
connected with the Defendants on trial. 
Under the circumstances, his appearance 
was certain to influence the jury and to 
prejudice Defendants' case. It is there-
fore respectfully submitted that the pre-
vious determination of this Court that 
the "record does not disclose that the third 
defendant was identified to the jury or was 
anything said or done which would tend to 
connect him with the two Defendants on trialw 
is factually in error and should be recon-
sidered. Furthermore, upon reconsideration, 
the judgments against Defendants on each 
charge should be reversed and appellants 
should be discharged or in the alternative, 
their cases should be remanded for new trials. 
-24-
Respectfully submitted. 
W!LLIAM D. MARSH. 
Attorney for Defendants-
Appellants 
1018 First Security Bank 
Building 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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